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Fired for Failing a Phishing Test: Binance's 2026 Policy

Marc David
Marc David Senior Security Engineer · CISSP
Phishing Security Awareness Training Binance Social Engineering
Fired for Failing a Phishing Test: Binance's 2026 Policy

Click the wrong link at Binance enough times, and the thing getting compromised might not be your inbox. It might be your job.

TL;DR: Binance’s internal red team runs fake phishing attacks on employees every month, and repeatedly failing them can hurt your performance review or cost you your job. It collides head-on with the industry’s favorite line: the human is never the weakest link, and employees should never be punished for clicking. The honest answer sits in the middle. Blame-only cultures break trust and quietly kill incident reporting, while zero-accountability ignores real, measurable risk. The programs that reduce clicks train immediately, reward reporting, and reserve real consequences for repeated, high-risk, unreported failures.


Most security awareness vendors will tell you to stop blaming the human. Binance took the opposite position, and said the quiet part out loud: if you keep clicking the links, you are the problem, and it goes on your review. For a company guarding billions in customer crypto, that’s either refreshing accountability or a fear culture in the making, depending on who you ask. Let’s look at what Binance is doing, whether you can be fired for failing a phishing test, and what a program that takes security seriously without torching its own culture looks like.

Jump to a section:

What is Binance doing to its staff?

Direct answer: Binance’s internal red team runs fake phishing attacks on employees every month, posing as recruiters or conference organizers. Staff who fail get remedial training, and repeat failures can land on performance reviews and lead to termination.

This isn’t a one-off stunt. The program has been running for three to four years, managed by Binance’s internal red team, the ethical hackers whose job is to break in and think like an attacker. Instead of only probing firewalls, they probe people.

The scenarios are nasty in exactly the way real attacks are. According to reporting from WEEX, the red team poses as recruiters offering jobs or sends invitations to free conferences that quietly request personal information, classic social-engineering hooks designed to see who bites. These aren’t cartoonish “Nigerian prince” emails. They’re the tailored, plausible lures that compromise people.

The tests run every month, and as crypto.news reports, employees who fail must complete remedial training while the company tracks whether security awareness is improving across the organization over time. Fail enough, and it stops being a training issue and becomes a review issue, and eventually an employment one. For a company that holds billions in customer funds, the logic isn’t hard to follow: one compromised employee inbox becomes one expensive, headline-making breach.

Can you get fired for failing a phishing test?

Direct answer: Yes, but rarely for one slip. Firing is usually reserved for repeat failures, high-risk roles, or hiding the mistake. A single click you report is worlds apart from ignoring training and failing the fourth test in a row.

Binance isn’t an outlier so much as an extreme, honest version of a widespread practice. A common corporate policy is the “three strikes” model, fail three simulations and you’re out, a norm openly discussed in security circles and covered by outlets like IT Brew, where CISOs describe exactly that escalation path for repeat offenders. Go looking on Reddit or Quora and you’ll find a steady stream of employees who got a scary meeting invite after failing a test at work, wondering if their job is on the line.

This debate is not new. Back in 2019, Krebs on Security asked whether failing phish tests should be a fireable offense, and the consensus even then was nuanced: termination purely for a single simulated click is heavy-handed and legally risky, but documented, repeated failure, especially paired with a refusal to complete training, can absolutely support disciplinary action. The through-line across all of it is pattern, not accident. It’s the same reason we keep saying modern phishing is less about clumsy typos and more about convincing pretexts, because if the lure is good enough, anyone can fail once.

How do corporate phishing tests work?

Direct answer: Security teams send realistic but fake phishing emails with no warning, measure who clicks, and drop anyone who fails into immediate training. Tools like KnowBe4, Proofpoint, and Microsoft Defender automate the sends and track click rates over time.

If you’ve never been on the running end of one, here’s the machinery behind a phishing test for employees.

It starts with a baseline. The security team sends a batch of fake-but-realistic phishing emails with no warning, then measures the click rate, how many people took the bait. That number is the “before” picture. Anyone who clicks gets dropped into immediate, targeted training, usually a short landing page that says “gotcha,” walks through the red flags they missed, and explains what a real attacker would have done next.

Then it repeats. Good programs run recurring simulations a few times a year (Binance does it monthly), rotating templates so people cannot memorize last quarter’s fake. All of this is powered by phishing simulation software, KnowBe4, Proofpoint, and Microsoft Defender’s attack simulation training are the household names, which automate the send, track clicks and credential entry, and chart click-rate over time. The intended outcome isn’t a “gotcha” scoreboard. It’s a measurable drop in how many people click when the real thing lands. That’s the whole point, or at least, it’s supposed to be.

Direct answer: Not exactly. Untrained, unsupported, unmeasured humans are the weak point, not people as such. Blaming the person ignores that most click-throughs trace back to a weak program, not a careless employee. The framing is lazy, but not entirely wrong.

Here’s where the industry splits down the middle.

On one side: stop blaming the human. This is the dominant view in security awareness circles, and for good reason. Firms like Hook Security argue employees should never be punished or fired for clicking a phishing test. The reasoning is behavioral. Punish people for clicking, and you don’t get fewer clicks, you get fewer reports. Employees who fear consequences hide their mistakes, and a hidden compromise is exactly the thing that turns a five-minute cleanup into a five-month incident. Blame culture, the argument goes, actively makes you less secure.

On the other side: accountability is not a dirty word. People who repeatedly ignore training and repeatedly fail represent a real, quantifiable business risk. We hold accountants accountable for financial errors and pilots accountable for checklists, so why is clicking a malicious link, over and over, in a role with sensitive access, treated as untouchable? At some point, “be kind about it” starts to sound like “no consequences ever,” and that’s not a security program, it’s a suggestion box.

Our take at ByteSizedSecurity: the “weakest link” framing is lazy, but the “never hold anyone accountable” framing is naive. Humans aren’t the weakest link, untrained and unsupported humans are. The failure is usually the program, not the person. But when the program is genuinely good, with clear training, fair tests, and repeated chances, and someone still keeps clicking while sitting on the keys to the vault, that stops being a training gap and starts being a fit problem. Both extremes are wrong. The truth lives in how you handle the pattern.

What does accountability without a blame culture look like?

Direct answer: Train the moment someone clicks, reward people who report phishing fast, and measure report-rate, not clicks alone. Reserve real consequences for the narrow overlap of repeated failure, high-risk access, and refusing to report or train.

So how do you get Binance’s seriousness without the fear? A few principles separate the programs that work from the ones that only scare people.

Make the failure a teachable moment, immediately. The click should trigger fast, specific, blame-free feedback, not a public shaming and not a note to the manager. In that first moment, the goal is learning, full stop. This is the whole premise behind why real employee security awareness training matters: behavior change comes from repetition and coaching, not humiliation.

Measure the right number. Click-rate gets all the attention, but the metric that predicts resilience is report-rate, how many people spot the phish and hit “report.” Reward reporting loudly. A team that reports fast is worth more than a team that never clicks but never speaks up.

Know what “good” even looks like. Industry benchmarks from Hoxhunt put typical phishing failure rates at 25 to 35 percent for organizations with no program, dropping to 5 to 10 percent for a mature awareness program and 2 to 5 percent for a behavior-focused one. If your click-rate is still in the 30s, the answer is a better program, not a firing squad.

Reserve consequences for the real risk pattern. Fair escalation targets the intersection of repeated failure, high-risk access, and failure to report or complete training, not a one-time slip by someone who owned it. If you’re going to attach consequences to reviews the way Binance does, that’s the bar.

The takeaway

Binance sits at the far, unapologetic end of a real spectrum. And while “click a link, lose your job” makes for a scary headline, the underlying instinct, that security is everyone’s responsibility and repeated negligence has consequences, isn’t crazy for a company guarding billions.

But the two extremes both fail. Pure blame breaks trust, kills reporting, and drives mistakes into the dark. Pure no-accountability ignores genuine, measurable risk. The organizations that get more secure do the boring middle thing: train relentlessly, test fairly, measure reporting, and reserve real consequences for real patterns. Fear is easy. Culture is the hard part, and it’s the part that works.

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